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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A-553 
The National League of Cities 
et al., Appellants, 
v. 
Peter J. Brennan, Secre-
tary of Labor. 
Application for Stay. 
[December 31 , 1974] 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER, Circuit Justice. 
This matter came to me as an individual Circuit 
Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit after the 
close of regular business hour of this Court on Tuesday, 
December 31, 1974, on a motion of the above-named 
appellants. States. and municipalities, The National 
League of Cities and the National Governors' Conference. 
The application of said parties requests a stay of those 
parts of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 
U. S. C. § 201 et seq., which go into effect January 1, 
1975, to stay Regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of Labor. 29 CFR Part 553-Employees of Public Agen-
cies Engaged in Fire Protection or Law Enforcement - -Activities. including security personnel in correctional 
institutions of said States and municipalities, and for an 
injunction against enforcement by the Secretary of Labor 
or by any other person in any federal court to enforce 
parts of the said 1974 Amendments to the above-
described Act, which went into effect May 1, 1974. 
The above-entitled case was filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia on Decem-
ber 12, 1974. A three-judge District Court was con-
vened and on Monday, December 30, 1974, heard argu-
ments on Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenors' ( all of who, 
except for Plaintiff Intervenor State of California, are 
; • - • 
2 NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. BRENNAN 
Appellants on this Application) Application for a Pre-
liminary Injunction. Earlier today an order was entered 
dated December 31, 1974, denying a Preliminary Injunc-
tion and dismissing the Complaint in the above-entitled 
action. 
The three-judge District Court in denying the relief 
on the day after it heard arguments expressed the view 
that the Complaint raised "a difficult and substantial 
question of law" but concluded that it was bound by 
this Court's holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, 39·2 U. S. 183 
(1968). 
In light of the pervasive impact of the judgment of the 
District Court on every state and municipal government 
in the United States, the novelty of the legal questions 
presented, the expressed concern of the District Court 
as to the substantiality of the constitutional questions 
raised, the brevity of time available to the District Court 
and to me as Circuit Justice. and the extent and nature of 
the injury to the applicants, it is not appropriate to take 
final action as an individual Justice. 
Against this background, and balancing the injury to 
the contemplated enforcement of the regulations by the 
Secretary, against the injury to the applicants if they 
are ultimately successful, and sharing the doubts and 
concerns articulated by the District Court. I am not pre-
pared-less than five hours before the Regulations of the 
Secretary become effective-to do more than enter an 
interim order granting the relief prayed for until the 
application can be pr~sented to the full Court at the 
earliest convenient elate. At that time the entire matter 
can be considered with the benefit of a response from 
the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary. 
Accordingly, an order will be entered forthwith, grant-
ing the relief prayed until fµrther order of the Court 
and referring the application to the full Court. 
The Solicitor General has been directed to file any 
response he desires to make on or before Wednesday', 
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BRENNAN, Sec 2y of Labor 
Motion to Intervene 
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IMMEDIATE SITUATION: The AFL-CIO, the International Association of 
Fire Fighters, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 
the International Union of Operating Engineers, the Service Employees International 
Union, the American Federation of Teachers, and the National Education Association 
move for leave to intervene in the instant case and to file a brief in opposition to 
petrs 2 application for stay. 
CONTENTIONS: Intervention: The unions contend that their membership com-
prises a large portion of state and municipal workers affected by the 1974 Amend-
-
t::"'· ' 
· 7:1ents~ to the FLSA. A- note that intervention at thi .. ge is unusual, but not 
unprecedented. Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, 389 U.S. 913; NLRB v. Acme 
Industrial Co., 384 U.S. 825 . They u rge that the broad injunction sought by petrs 
deprives all public employee s of their right to sue under § l 6(b) of the Act and note 
that petr State s and Cities did not seek this relief below. They argue that to enjoin 
these employees from exerci s ing this right without giving them an opportunity to 
be heard raise questions o f due process. They also note that had such relief been 
sought below, they could have intervened pursuant to Rule 24 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. 
and a r gue the rule here by a nalogy. 
The unions also urg e that the interests of their members will not be adequately 
represented by resp Sec'y. They note that the FLSA protects 2 overlapping interests--
that of the individual employee i n adequate pay etc. and that of the public in industrial 
peace etc. and feel that they more a dequately represent the interests of the employees. 
• The unions specifically cite the 11only indirect concern 11 that the Sec 1 y has in defending 
•'(°.: '.!-. ' ... --
the employ e es1 right to sue a state in federal court against an Eleventh Amend. claim. 
They also t ake issue with several statements made by petrs in their proposed 
J. S. --~ "The affected employees .•• are more concerned with maintaining their 
status ~and not jeopardizing or losing their jobs through the increased costs 
imposed by the A ct. "--and have attached an affidavit in response. 
APFLICATION: The unions oppose granting any interim relief to petrs. On 
the merits, their argument follows that of the SG. 
On the equities, the unions note the extensive coverage of the 1974 Amendments, 
including the i ncreased minimum wage applicable to those employees found constitu-
tionally covered in Wirtz. The unions also note the lateness with which petr s seek 
this relief and depreciate their argument that they were misled, urging that petr s 




~i~ti~ns participate d avely in the legislative procese As· does the SG., the 
unions also a dvise that the departmental "regulations II complained of by petr s are 
merely interpr etative guidelines. With respect to a specific injunction against 
employe e s e nfo rcing the rights accorded them under amended §16(b) of the Act., the 
unions a r gu e that petrs have an adequate remedy at law, since they can assert the 
11th Amen d . and that equitable relief at this time is not warranted. 
F i nally., the unions contend that in light of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 6 51., 
t h ere is a possibility that an injunction might permanently deprive employees of the 
right t o obtain back wages in the event petr s do not prevail on the merits. The unions 
urge that i f relief is granted, such relief should be framed to avoid this result., 
p o s sib ly through an escrow arrangement. 
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to the Chief Justice and by Him ~ 
Referred to the Court. ~ 4.-
Application for Stay Presented 
to the Chief Justice and by Him 
Referred to the Court. 
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Also, Motion for Expedited Appeal 
IMMEDIATE SITUATION: Petrs, 19 states, three cities and the National League 
of Cities, seek to enjoin/ stay enforcement of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and related departmental regulations which extend minimum wage, 
overtime pay etc. coverage under the Act to certain state and local government 
-
- - t:, -employees , including police and firemen. The Chief J.ice granted interim relief, 
granting the relief prayed for pending r eferral of the application to the full Court. 
See attached Chambers Opinion. 
F ACTS: Petrs brought suit on December 12, 1974, in USDC (D. C.) to enjoin, as 
unconstitutional, the enforcement of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (P. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U.S. C. 201 et~•) insofar as those 
amendments would extend to an additional 3. 4 million state and local government 
employee s ( sanitation workers, policemen, firemen, recreation employees, librarians 
etc.) FLSA requirements respecting., i nter alia, ( 1) a minimum wage, (2) record 
keeping, (3) time and a half pay for all time worked over 40 hours, (4) a prohibition 
against the employment of hazardous child labor, ( 5) a prohibition against sex-based 
wage differential s and ( 6) a prohibition against age discrimination. The amendments 
generally went into effect on May 1, 1974, except for the provisions relating to over-
- time pay of police and firemen which was to become effective January 1, 1975. 
On December 31, 1975., a 3-J USDC (D. C.) (Leventhal, Gasch, Parker; E:....£!) 
denied petr s 1 m otion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint, finding 
that although p etrs r aised" a difficult and substantial question of law, 11 the case was 
.controlled by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), in which this Court upheld 
the constitutionality of an earlier extension of the FLSA to employees of state-
operated schools and hospitals. Citing the rationale of the Court in Wirtz that state 
hospitals and schools were significant purchasers of out-of-state goods and that strikes 
and work stoppages involving their employees would consequently interrupt and burden 
the flow of goods across state lines, the USDC noted that it is uncontested that the 
state and municipal institutions whose employees are reached by the 1974 Amendments 
- make substantial purchases in interstate commerce. In substantial dicta, however, 




- - 3 - -in c ompetition with private industry; expressed concern over the extensiveness 
o f the a mendments and the enormous fiscal burden they impose on the states; and 
sugge sted t hat the Court may feel it appropriate to draw back from the far -reaching 
implications of Wirtz. 
The USDC denied interim relief pending appeal here partially on the ground that 
the only assistance available from such relief would be that states failing to comply 
wi th the new provisions would not be exposed to the liquidated damages and double 
damage penalties provided for bad faith violations of the Act. The USDC felt that 
since its opinion recognizes that petrs have raised a substantial constitutional ques-
Hon, this will be sufficient to indicate that the claim of the part of the cities and 
s tates that the Act cannot be constitutionally enforced has been raised in good faith. 
I n their present application, petr s, pending appeal here., seek a stay of the 19 74 
.Amendments scheduled to go into effect January l; a stay of the related departmental 
re gulations promulgated December 20, 39 Fed. Reg. 44142; an injunction against 
any enfo.rcement by resp of those parts of the 1974 Amendments which went into 
effect May 1; and an injunction of any action by any person other than resp, in any 
Federal Court., to enforce those parts of the 1974 Amendments which went into effect 
May 1. 
CONTENTIONS: (1) Petrs, arguing concepts of federalism, contend that the 
Federal Government has gone too far, that the state and local government employees 
involved are engaged in sovereign governmental functions of the states and their 
subdivisions, and that they are not engaged in commerce. California picks up on 
t he observation of the USDC that the instant case, unlike Wirtz, involves fire, 
polic e, and other "governmental" personnel 1not seriously in competition with private 
e nte rprise 1 and notes this Court's stated responsibility to review Congress' exercise 





Fry, Iowa v. 
- - 4 -
Brennan, No. 73-1565 (being held for J and Coon v. California, 
520 P. 1003 (1974), which petrs state is on its way to the Court. 
On the equity side, petrs concede that they are somewhat late in seeking relief 
but urge that they were mislead by the legislative history of the amendments which 
indicated that the fiscal impact on the Cities and States would be small, but that in 
preparation of their 197 5 budgets the magnitude of the Act's costs became clear for 
the fir st time. Petr s estimate that the additional costs for firemen alone in 197 5 --will be $200,000,000 and possibly one billion dollars for all state and local government 
--------employees. -- __...-, --
Petr s also contend that the application of industry oriented regulations to cities 
is creating mass confusion and that the police and firemen overtime regulations 
issued December 20 could not possibly be implemented in the short time remaining 
before the January 1 effective date. 
Petrs urge that the importance of the issues involved and the enormous impact 
that the -Amendments would have upon them require that the status quo be maintained 
pendente lite and that an expedited briefing schedule is warranted. 
(2) On the merits, the SG relies on Wirtz and argues that the employees to be 
covered by the 1974 Amendments are basically of the same type as the 2. 9 million 
held to be validly covered in Wirtz, i.e. nonsupervisory civil service employees who 
are neither elected nor appointed. Nor, the SG contends, can Wirtz be distinguished 
on the ground that the activities covered by the new Amendments are more "govern-
mental" than the school, hospital and transit activities involved in Wirtz--States and 
local governments can no more discontinue their schools and mental hospitals than 
• they can their police and fire protection services. 
On the equities, the SG contends that a restraint on enforcement of the Amend-
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· ultimately upheld by the Court, petrs > statutory obligat.s for back pay will reach 
back to the effective dates of the provisions. On the other hand, if petrs1 position 
is sustained, the denial of the restr aints sought here will not have resulted in any 
rrharm" because pending the determination of the constitutionality issue, they would 
not be compelled to make t he payments required by the Act. The SG notes that 
criminal penalties are provi ded only for "wilful violations, 11 that liquidated damages 
are n ot author ized where the employer has "acted in good faith 11 and that the Secretary 
will not seek to invoke these provisions. 
The SG also notes that the broad relief sought by petrs would enjoin the new mini-
mum wage rates for employees covered by the Amendments upheld in Wirtz, the age 
discrimination prohibitions etc. and that the departmental guidelines published on 
December 20 do not impose any requirements in addition to those imposed by the 
statute and thems elve s have no "effective date. 11 
DISCUSSION: The SG1 s argument on the irreparable injury issue tracks that of 
the 3-J USDC. Petr s fail to respond to it effectively, but it would appear unseemly 
to have our Sta tes and Cities in noncompliance. 
If a stay is granted, the Court may wish to fashion its relief more narrowly 
than that prayed for by petrs. 
There is a response. 
There is a motion for expedited review. Petrs, in each application, have filed 
advanced copies of their J. S. 
1/9/75 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. A- 553 
The Xational League of Cities 
et al., AppeJlants, 
v. 
Peter J. Brennan , Secre-
tary of Labor. 
Application for Stay. 
[DecC'mber 31, 1974] 
MR. CHIEF Jl' STICE BURGER, Circuit Justice. 
This matter came to me as an individual Circuit 
Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit after the 
close of regular business hour of this Court on Tuesday, 
December 31. 1974, on a motion of the above-named 
appellants, States. and municipalities, The National 
League of Cities and the National Governors' Conference. 
The application of said parties requests a stay of those 
parts of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, Pub. L. 93- 259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 
U. S. C. ~ 201 et seq., which go into effect January 1, 
1975, to stay Regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of Labor, 29 CFR Part 553-Employees of Public Agen-
cies Engaged in Fire Protection or Law Enforcement 
Activities. includillg security personnel in correctional 
institutions of said States and municipalities, and for an 
injunction against enforcement by the Secretary of Labor 
or by any other person in any federal court to enforce 
parts of the said 1974 Amendments to the above-
described Act, which went into effect l\fay 1, 1974. 
The above-entitled case was filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia on Decem-
ber 12, 1974. A three-judge District Court was con-
vened and on !vlonday. December 30, 1974, heard argu-
ments on Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Intervenors' (all of who, 







2 NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. BREKNAN 
Appellants on this Application) Application for a Pre-
liminary Injunction. Earlier today an order was entered 
dated December 31 , 1974, denying a Preliminary Injunc-
tion and dismissing the Complaint in the above-entitled 
action. 
The three-judge District Court in denying the relief 
on the day after it heard arguments expressed the view 
that the Complaint raised "a difficult and substantial 
que~.tion of law" but concluded that it was bound by 
this Court's holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 
(1968). 
In light of the pervasive impact of the judgment of the 
District Court on every state and municipal government 
in the United States, the novelty of the legal questions t? 
presented, the expressed concern of the District Court 
as to the substantiality of the constitutional questions 
raised, the brevity of time available to the District Court 
and to me as Circuit Justice. and the extent and nature of 
the injury to the applicants, it is not appropriate to take 
final action as an individual Justice. 
Against this background, and balancing the injury to 
the contemplated enforcement of the regulations by the 
Secretary, against the injury to the applicants if they 
are ultimately successful. and sharing the doubts and 
concerns articulated by the District Court. I am not pre-
pared-less than fi\'e hours before the Regulations of the 
Secretary become effective-to do more than enter an 
interim order granting the relief prayed for until the 
application can be presented to the full Court at the 
('arliest convenient date. At that time the entire matter 
can be considered with the benefit of a response from 
the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary. 
Accordingly, an order will be entered forthwith, grant-
ing the relief prayed until further order of the Court 
and referring the application to the full Court. 
The Solicitor General has been directed to file any 
response he desires to make on or before Wednesday', 
,January 8, 1975. 
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1. Appellants, 19 states, three cities, the National League of Cities and the 
National Governors 1 Conference, challenge the constitutionality of the 1974 Amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which extend minimuin wage, overtim.e pay 
- etc. coverage to certain state and local government employees, including police and 
firemen. The 3-J USDC dismissed app e llants 1 complaint for declaratory and injunc -
tive relief, holding_ that the case was controlled by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 
FACTS: The FLS-as originall: · enacted in 1938,-quired employers covered 
by the Act to pay those of their employees who were engaged in com1nerce or in the 
- p roduction of goods for commerce a minimum wage, as well as one and one - half times 
v-.1re. 
their regular ~ of pay for hours worked in exc 1.: s s of 40 a week; to keep records 
necessary for the enforcement of the Act; and to comply with certain child labor 
s tandards. The States and their political subdivisions were specifically excluded fron, 
t he Act1 s coverage. 
I n 1961, Congress extended the coverage of the Act, beyond employees themselves 
e ngaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, to all employees 
of certain 11 enterprises 11 which had some employees so engaged. The States and local 
g overnments remained among the employers specifically excluded from FLSA coverage. 
In 1966, Congress extended the Act1 s coverage to 2 . 9 million employees of State 
I 
~
a nd other public enterprises engaged in operating-transit compani\es;> hospitals , schools . ----- and related institutions. Except to this extent 11any State or political subdivision of a 
State 11 was excluded from the Act1 s definition of an 11 Employer . 11 The constitutionality 
of this extension of FLSA 1 s provisions to the States and local governments was upheld 
in Wirtz. 
In 1 974, Congress amended the Act to cover an additional 3 . 3 million (appellants 
s ay 11 al1 11 ) nonsupervisory state and local government employees . This extension of 
"Z. 
coverage was accomplished by removing the exclusionary language from the Act's 
d efinition of 11Employer 11 and by adding to it the phrase "public agency 11 (Nat1 1 
L eague of Cities J. S. App . 4b). npublic agency" in turn was defined to include 11the 
government of a State or political subdivision thereof11 (J. S. App. Sb) . The definition 
of an "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com1nerce 11 
- was amended to include 11an activity of a public agency11 and to provide that: 
The employees of an enterprise which is a public 
agency shall for the purposes of this subsection 
be deemed to be e1nployees engaged in commerce , 
(-
or employa handling, selling, or otherwi-working 
on goods or materials that have been moved in or 
produced for commerce. (J. S. App. Sb). 
The amendment of the definition of 11Employer 11 also has the affect of allowing public . , 
employees to bring suit in federal court pursuant to §16(b) of the Act against States 
and local governn1ents to recover minimum wages or overtime compensation unlaw-
__, 
fully withheld. 
The amendments generally went into effect on May 1, 1974, except for the pro-
visions relating to overtime pay for police and firemen which were to become effective 
January 1, 1975. 
In Dec ber, appellants sued in USDC (D. C.) to enjoin enforcement of the 1974 
Amendments insofar as they apply to States and local governments. They contended 
that the FLSA amendments violated the 5th, 10th and 11th Amendments. The 3-J 
-USDC denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed appellants 1 complaint, holding 
__ that although appellants raised 11a difficult and substantial question of law, 11 the case 
was controll ed by Wirtz. Citing the finding of the Co'.lrt in Wirtz that there was a 
sufficient rational relationship of the 1966 Amendments to interstate commerce in 
that state hospitals and schools were significant purchasers of out-of- state goods 
and that strikes and work stoppages involving their employees would ~ns.eqneot:ly 
interrupt and burden the flow of goods across state lines, the USDC noted that it 1s 
uncontested here that the state and mu::ii'cipal institutions whose employees are 
reached by the 1974 Amendments make substantial purchases in interstate commerce. 
In substantial dicta, however, the USDC, noting other language of the Court in Wirtz, 
392 U.S. at 197, commented that the institutions in issue here perform governmental 
functions, not seriously iI_Lco1npetition with private industry. The USDC also expressed .... 
- concern over the extensive reach of the 1974 Amendments and the fiscal burden they 
impose and suggested that the Court may feel it appropriate 11 to draw back from the 




The Court granted.pellants a stay of the effectiv-ss of the 1974 Amendments, 
conditioned on an expedited schedule for filing of their J. S.
1 
s. 
CONTENTIONS: (1) Appellants seek to limit Wirtz to its facts and distinguish 
it from the present case. They argue that reliance on the 11labor strife 11 rationale 
and the 11use of goods imported interstate 11 theory of Wirtz in not enough, but that 
Wirtz also requires that the government enterprises in question must be found to be 
in competition with private industry. They note the finding in Wirtz that State schools 
and hospitals are to some extent in competition with private schools and hospitals and 
contend that it was this distinction which the USDC failed to recognize. They empha-
size, of course, the Amendments1 application to police and firemen and maintain that 
these 11e s sential Government functions 11 compete with no one. 
Analogizing to the 11 rational basis 11 test employed in other Co::i.stitution contexts, 
appellants contend that Federal legislation which interferes with rights and powers 
protected by the 10th Amendment must also be scrutinized under the 5th Amend1nent 
standard of rationality. They contend that the Court did not have to consider such a 
~
test in Wirtz because of its finding of no Federal interference with State and City 
functions, and argue that in view of the broad reach of the Amendments here the 
Court cannot escape such consideration. They distinguish such cases as United 
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175; California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577; and 
Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, as involving "proprietary" functions and argue that 
V\ <? 'i' ". \ \ ,, \, "'< 
a State1 s sovereign, non-competitive, unique functions such as those ~ ~ no 
rational relationship to commerce so as to create a constitutional basis for their 
regulation under the Commerce Clause 
Appellant California emphasizes the importance of this case to the States in 
-- terms of fiscal expenditures as well as State programs and argues that in V{irtz 
the Court itself recognized the importance of judicial review of Congress 1 exercise 
of the com1nerce power. 
.. (2) The SG argues-at there is no significant diffe-ces between this case 
and Wirtz, that lhe several constitutional questions raised by appellants were 
- settled in Wirtz and that the judgment of the USDC should be affirmed. The SG 
-
-
argues that there is no significant difference between the activities reached in Wirtz 
and those reached here, but even if there were , that the Court1 s finding of a 11 rational 
basis 11 for congressional action in Wirtz relied on the 11labor strife 11 and 11goods 
imported" findings and is dispositive here. 
The SG maint~ins that appellants argument of an unconstitutional "take -over 11 
of state and local government budgets and personnel was rejected in Wirtz, as well 
as in two previous cases, Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, and United 
States v. California, 29 U.S. 175. The SG also contends that appellants 1 attempts to 
distinguish the instant case on the claim that "essential Government services 11 and 
11unique sovereign governmental functions 11 has no basis. He relies o::i the language 
of Wirtz 11that the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated power, may 
override countervailing state interests whether these be de scribed as 1 governmental1 
or 1proprietary1 in character' 1 392 U.S. at 195. The SG argues that the schools and 
hospitals covered by the 1966 Amendments were as much 11essential Government 
\ services 11 as any of the public agencies covered by the 1974 Amendments. 
There is a motion to affirm. 
1/23/75 
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April 17, 1975 
No. 74-878 National League of Cities 
v. DunlOE, 
MEMO FOR CONFERENCE 
I summarize my present thinking, subject to Conference 
discussion, as follows: 
Reconciling two constitutional provisions or principles: 
We must reconcile the federal government's connnerce 
power with principles of federalism (described as the 10th 
Amendment or more generally as federalism in a broder sense). 
/ In my view, federalism is an independent constitutional 
principle that can limit exercise of the commerce power 
I 
in the same way that provisions guaranteeing individual 
liberties do. 
The problem is how best to acconnnodate the connnerce 
clause and federalism when they collide. I am aided here by 
the concession of the Solicitor General that preservation of 
the states as autonomous political units, and government's 
functioning independently of the federal government is 
essential. Indeed, the structure of our Constitution, the 
system of "sovereign states", and indeed our entire history 
support the concept of federalism. It is as central to our 







One may deduce from the foregoing a presumption that the 
burden is on the government to support the validity of 
federal action which restricts or interferes with (as in this 
case) the carrying out by the states of governmental functions. 
But given such a presumption, it is still necessary to identify 
a principled basis of analysis for drawing the line. 
Balancing analysis 
The Solicitor General suggested that this Court, on a 
case-by-case basis, must balance the asserted federal interests 
against the degree of interference with state interests. The 
SG apparently considers the level of permissible interference 
to be a factual matter, with findings by Congress to be given 
controlling weight so long as there is "a rational basis" 
supporting them. 
I think we could decide this case on a balancing analysis, 
and conclude that here Congress has gone too far. Although 
the initial impact on the states may be only minimal in terms 
of dollars or even record keeping, the federal interference 
is nevertheless substantial. 
The interference derives primarily from the inje-ction 
of federal regulation of the very core of state government, 
namely, the employer-employee relationship with respect to 
governmental functions. As noted in argument, state employees 






will view the federal government as the repository of ultimate 
power over wages and working conditions. If the Congress has 
the power to prescribe minimum wages, it also has the power 
to increase these from time to time, to include (and the SG 
concedes) executive and administrative officers and employees, 
and to apply the National Labor Relations Act to state 
employees. These are serious interferences with vital functions 
and responsibilities of state sovereignty. 
The primary interest invoked by the SG in his argument 
is the need to prevent substandard wages. This, in itself, 
reflects the significance of the federal intrusion. The mere 
fact that Congress here in Washington determines that wages 
are substandard does not mean that, in fact, they are 
substandard in every state for all employees of state and 
all local governments. The judgment of the federal govern-
ment in Washington will have been substituted for that of the 
states and localities. 
The SG argues, of course, that because of substandard 
wages there may be adverse effects in terms of labor unrest 
and unfair competition. These are legitimate arguments but, 
as I would weigh them in the scales, they would not over-








j ./jjtl' I.. 
The necessity rationale 
I_ vea (fO-' flltfl 1 
he 1'll o-fi" 
Another analytical approach would test the federal 
legislation in tenns of its essentiality to the effectuation 
of the federal program. In this case, for example, the 
question is whether subjecting all state employees to FLSA 
standards is necessary or essential to the effectiveness of 
national wage and hour regulation? The short answer, perhaps, 
is that more than a third of a century has passed since FLSA 
was enacted in 1938, and only in 1974 did Congress undertake 
to regulate state employees. I know of no finding that this 
regulation is necessary - at this late date - to effectuate 
the basic objectives of the Act. 
Or putting it differently, the national interests in 
~promoting fair wages and hours in private industry is not 
frustrated or handicapped by failing to include all state 
employees. 
A distinction may be properly drawn here between 
employees of state activities that compete with private 
enterprise, and state employees who do not so compete. 
If t~e states are left out, they would have a competitive 
advantage over private enterprise that might lead to a 
misallocation of resources or to unfair competition. Thus, 
I could support Wirtz as to hospitals - although perhaps 







The "necessity principle" also is compatible with the 
result in Fry, where inclusion of state and local employees 
was necessary to the effectuation of the national program. 
It also is compatible with Sanitary District v. United States, 
where the national interest in the water level and navigation 
on the Great Lakes would have been adversely affected. 
United States v. California was the authority which Justice 
Harlan found to be controlling in Wirtz. Its rationale was 
that the operation by California of a railroad directly in 
interstate commerce had an adverse effect on such cormnerce 
as well as on fair competition with privately operated 
railroads. To prevent such competition, it was necessary 
to regulate the state competitor. 
In sum, whether I adopt the balancing approach suggested 
by the SG or the "necessity principle" to effectuate legitimate 
federal policy, I conclude that Congress has gone too far by 
extending FLSA to all state and local governmental employees -
wholly without regard to their particular relationship to 
interstate commerce, to any specific federal program, and 
in the absence of competition with private interests. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
ss 
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One may deduce from the foregoing a _p~esumption that the 
' . ..,r f 
! '~ ", _ , f 11 burden is on the, government to support . ·the :validity of 
federal action which, restricts or interfere• with (as in this 
case) the carrying out·· by the 'states 'of governmental functions. 
But given such a presumption, it is still necessary to identify 
a principled basis of analysis for drawing the line. 
Balancing analysis 
'!be Solicitor General suggested that this Court, on a 
case-by-case basis, must balance the asserted federal interests 
against the degree of interference with state interests. '!be 
SG apparently considers the level of permissible interference 
to be a factual matter, with findings by Congress to be given 
controlling weight so long as there is "a rational basis" 
supporting them. 
I think we could decide this case on a balancing analysis, 
and conclude that here Congress has gone too far. Although 
the initial impact on the states may be only minimal in terms 
of dollars or even record keeping, the federal interference 
is nevertheless ~ubstantial. 
'!be interference derives 
' 
of federal regulation of the very core of state government, 
namely, the employer-employee relationship with respect to 
governmental functions. As noted in argument, state employees 
may no longer look primarily to their employetrs but rather 
• - 3. 
will view the federal gove~ent as the repository,, of ultimate 
r 
power over wages and wo1:king cond(tions. If tlie Congress has 
. ' ' '· .. 1 •.. r' 
. ' 
the power to prescribe minimum wages. it also has the power 
tf:·,. t I t 't 
to increase these . from'· time to time; ·to include (and the SG 
- , ~· . ',- . . . 
concedes) executive anci adm~istrative (?fficers and employees. 
. . 
' ' 
and to apply the 'Nationai Labor Relati"ons Act to state 
employees. These are serious interferences with vital functions 
and responsibiiities of state sovereignty. 
The primary interest invoked by the SG in his argument 
is the need to prevent substandard wag.es. This• in itself, 
reflects the significance of the federal intrusion. The mere 
fact that Congress here in Washington determines .that wages 
' 
are substandard does not mean that, in fact, they are 
substandard in every state for a~l employees of state ~d 
all local governments. The judgment of the federal govern-
ment in Washington will have been substituted for that of the 
state• and localities. 
The SG argues, of course, that because of substandard 
wages there may be adverse effects in terms of labor unrest 
and unfair ·competition. These are legitimate arguments but, 
as 1 ·wo~ld weigh them in the scales, they would not over-
balance the degree of intrusion upon legitimate state 
functions. 
. ---:;-. --:-----~--~-~~~----~----
• • 4. 
The necessity rationale 
Another analytical approach would test the federal 
legislation in terms of its essentiality to the effectuation 
of the federal program. In this case, for example, the 
question is whether subjecting all state employees to FLSA 
standards is necessary or essential to the effectiveness of 
national wage and hour regulation? The short answer, perhaps, 
is that more than a third of a century has passed since FLSA 
I 
was enacted in 1938, and only in 1974 did Congress undertake 
to regulate state employees. I know of no finding ·, that this 
regulation is necessary - at this late date - to effectuate 
the basic -objectives of the Act. 
Or putting it differently, the national interests in 
promoting fair wages and hours in priva te industry is riot 
frustrated or handicapped by failing to include all state 
employees. I,.._ 
A distinctionft~drawnl.here between 
employees of state activities that compete with private 
enterpr:l.iur,: and· _sta.te , ~ployees who do 1-1ot rs9 compete. 
t, ' 1.. , ~: (·:::•. J l, • I • • t ,... ~ .· - ., .,. 
If the states are left out, they would have a competitive 
.. , I 
advantage over _private enterprise,- t~t 1might lead to a . . 
misallocation of resources or to ,unfair ,,competition. Thus, 
I could support Wirtz as to hospitals· - although perhaps 
not as to schools. 
~ 
- ~. ·/ 
~ • • s. 
The "necessity principle" also is compatible with the 
result in l.!:I,, where inclusion of state and local employees 
was necessary to the effectuation of the. national ·program. 
It also is compatible with Sanitary District v. United States, 
where the national interest in the water level and navigation 
on the Great Lakes ~ould have been adversely affected. 
United States v. California was the authority which Justice 
Harlan found to be controlling in Wirtz. It• rationale was 
that the operation by California of a railroad directly in 
interstate commerce had an adverse effect on such comnerce 
. . 
as well as on fair competition -with privately operated 
railroads. To prevent such competition, it was necessary 
to regulate the state competitor. 
In sum, whether I adopt the balancing approach suggested 
by the SG or the ''necessity principle" to effectuate legitimate 
federal policy, I conclude that Congress has gone too far by 
extending FLSA to ill. state and local governmental employees -
wholly without regard to their ·particular relationship to 
interstate commerce, to any specific federal program, and 











Mr. Justice Powell 
Penny Clark 
• 
DATE: April 17, 1975 
No. 74-878 National League of Cities v. Dunlop 
No. 74-879 California v. Dunlo£ 
I have arranged this memo in two parts: (1) a discussion 
"3 ct'Z..t.lS" l8> 
whether, without overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, you can hold 
that the 1974 FLSA amendments, as applied to all state and 
local government employees, lack a "rational basis" under 
the commerce clause, and (2) an outline of a constitutional 
doctrine that would use the principles of federalism to limit 
regulation of state activities under the commerce power. 
I. 
Two theories have been used in the past to support the 
FLSA under the commerce clause. First is the "unfair com-
petition" theory, based on the fact that effective regulation - ,. of wages in an industry requires regulation of all who compete 
in that industry. If only some of the competitors are subject 
to minimum wage laws, then other competitors will have a price 
advantage. This theory was strong support for action under 
--- -......, _,,,..,,, ~ 
the commerce clause in 1938, when some states had minimum 
..,, ~- .... 
wages and others did not, because the wage differential 
effected a discrimination in interstate commerce against 
industry in minimum-wage states. It has less validity when 




- • 2. 
enterprise in a single state, but it may still furnish some 
justification for regulatin g governmental activities that are 
in competition with private enterprise. The second theory 
supporting the FLSA relies on the connection between substandard 
working conditions and labor disputes. Because labor disputes, 
Q 4bSC2 .,,-, r:bJ, 
particularly strikes, can impede the flow of goods in inter-
state commerce, Congress can act to protect interstate commerce 
by prohibiting substandard working conditions that may lead to 
such labor disputes. This is the theory on which the Court 
relied in Wirtz to uphold minimum wages and overtime provisions 
in state hospitals and schools. (I will use the word "state" 
to 
to refer both/state and local government throughout this memo). 
Because state hospitals and schools purchased a substantial 
quantity of interstate goods, the Court reasoned that Congress 
could have believed that labor disputes in schools and 
hospitals would burden this flow of goods in commerce. 
I had hoped that we could make an argument for 
distinguishing Wirtz on the ground appellants have referred 
1966 
to as the "ultimate consumer" issue. Under the/amendments 
I '- \ 
l enter prises were not covered by the FLSA unless they had 
employees that handled "goods" that either were destined for 
interstate ' commerce or had already moved in interstate commerce. 
The term "goods" was defined to exclude goods in the hands of 
wt,;c_ate. 
an wau M&ti@ consumer. Consequently, a hospital or school 
was not covered under the 1966 amendments unless it somehow ---- ....., -- .. 
sold interastate g___oods to its patients or students. Under 




- • 3. 
the 1974 amendments, this limitation b:J disappeared. State -agencies are declared to be enterprises whose em£_loyees handle 
...... ------ :;_, 
interstate goods, regardless of fact. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s). - z.w;:: ----=----
As I see it, labor strife among employees handling goods in 
an interstate production or distribution chain would more 
directly disrupt interstate commerce than labor strife among 
employees whose employers merely purchase interstate goods 
for consumption. But for purpose of constitutional limits 
on the commerce power - apart from the limits imposed by 
federalism - I think it is a matter of degree rather than 
substance, and I would be reluctant to hold that one is 
constitutionally de minimis when the other is not. In terms 
of established "rational basis" analysis, I suppose Congress 
could reasonably believe that long-term strikes in a consumer 
enterprise could reduce the enterprise's purchases and thus 
"burden commerce". 
I therefore have withdrawn to a more traditional approach ~. 
i.,)~ 
of examining the facts asserted as a "rational basis" for the ---· -----
1974 amendments. The Solicitor General presents three 
alternate "rational bases". 
(1) Labor striie theory. In 1971 state expenditures 
for goods and services (other than employees > wages) represented 
5% of the gross national product. Many· of these expenditures 
represent purchases of interstate goods. Labor disputes and 
work stoppages in public agencies could decrease the purchase 




- • 4. 
some public employees, such as police, firemen and utility 
workers, can disrupt interstate commerce and industry directly 
by depriving them of necessary services. 
To the extent that many states do not allow their employees 
to strike, the Solicitor General's argument could be challenged 
on factual grounds. The question for commerce clause analysis, 
however, is whether the potential for strikes in those states 
that allow them (and for other forms of work slowdowns in states 
that don't) is sufficient to support a congressional decision 
to regulate working conditions in all state agencies rather 
than in just those that present the problem. 
Another problem with the Solicitor General's analysis, 
perhaps more fruitful for our purposes, is the breadth of 
the regulation. In Wirtz this Court sustained FLSA coverage 
,,--.. 
of employees who did not themselves handle interstate goods 
under the "enterprise theory". According to the Court in 
Wirtz, under the Act an enterprise was "a set of operations 
whose activities in commerce would all be expected to be -
affected by the wages and hours of any group of employees." 
392 U.S. at 197 n. 27. Congress could regulate the working 
conditions of all employees within such an enterprise because 
the wages of all would affect the price of the interstate goods 
being produced or the employer's ability to make interstate 
purchases, and because labor strife among any group of 
employees could affect the rest of the J~t*\~ operation. 
Under the 1974 amendments, any public agency (including an 
-
-
- • 5. 
entire state) is deemed an "enterprise" so that the Act covers 
-.........:: -------
all employees, regar~ e ~ of whether they personallz handle 
a ~ • 
interstate goods or whether their dissatisfaction would be - --expected to affect other parts of the "enterprise" that do. 
Because this factual premise is lacking, I find it much 
harder to sustain the "labor strife" theory as a rational basis 
for regulating the working conditions of all state employees, 
unless we make the assumption that all state employees have 
some contact with articles that have at some time traveled 
in interstate commerce, and that the cont•act is of such a 
character that work slowdowns would be expected to decrease 
~ .,e_ A• P1 h, )~ 
the purchases of such articles. .. ,.;_ ... 1 ~~ 1 
~ -~, -- , 
A decision denying rational basis on these grounds would 
lead to reversal only if there is no rational basis on the 
other two grounds as well. To some extent, such a decision 
would affect the operation of the FLSA in the private sector 
since the 1974 amendments also had the practical effect of 
nullifying the "ultimate consumer" exception. (Now the Act 
covers enterprises that have employees handling "goods or 
materials" that have moved in, or are destined for, interstate 
commerce. Although the definition of "goods" is still 
restrictive, "materials" is not defined to exalude goods 
purchased for consumption. If this change is read to bring 
..., under the FLSA employees who have contact with type-
writers or motor vehicles that have moved in interstate 








of the "labor strife" theory as a support for the Act. I 
think it rather unlikely that an employer's capital expenditures 
would be diminished significantly by labor disputes with his 
employees : ) 
(2) Unfair competition theory. The Solicitor General 
confesses that only some agencies compete with private 
enter prise. Thus, I have no difficulty in saying that the -
unfair competition theory is inadequate to support an extension 
~ ... ~------- a.www.a ,,,,_,, .... --- • - --- ~ 
of the FLSA to all state agencies. - To avoid this problem, - ~ ........ ,,,_,z.wu;: .,.,...,,-,-. 
the Solicitor General suggests that states and local govern-
ments compete among themselves for the location of industry, 
and that the commerce clause gives Congress power to prohibit 
such competition on the basis of low taxes grounded on 
substandard working conditions. This is a novel constitutional 
theory, and I do not find it persuasive. An amicus brief 
raises another theory of unfair competition: states frequently 
subcontract services to private enterprise; if they can pay 
low wages to their employees, they will subcontract less; 
therefore, low wages have an impact on private enterprise. 
lo:i ln-.t ~ 1'.0t 1'!.L'uJ h ~ c(),A~ res.s) 
I tend to think this argument~does not provi e tH necessary 
link to interstate corrnnerce. Most subcontracting would 
involve services, local in nature, and whether the work is 
subcontracted or performed by the state's employees would 







(3) A new theory: "economic health." The Solicitor 
General argues that the commerce clause empowers Congress to 
regulate the national economy and therefore enables it to take 
measures to eliminate substandard wages, decrease joblessness, 
and stimulate (or discourage) consumer spending, all in the 
name of economic health. Although this is new as a constitutional 
t heory offered in support of the FLSA, it is probably the most 
honest reflection of the true purpose behind the 1974 amendments. 
Analytically, it seems an almost unimpeachable interpretation 
of the commerce power. The argument has two premises: (1) 
the state of the economy has a substantial impact on "commerce" 
even if that term is defined narrowly, to mean only the flow 
of goods; (2) the economy must be monitored to keep it 
healthy and to avoid burdens on "commerce," and only the 
federal government can perform this function effectively. 
Despite the soundness of the theory in general, I have 
) s~me questions about the factual premise for its application 
here. The Solicitor General says that the theory supports 
the 1974 FLSA amendments because they have the effect of 
spreading jobs, reducing unemployment, and stimulating consumer 
s pending. The overtim~ provisions of the FLSA~ ave the 
effect of spreading jobs and reducing unemployment: instead 
7 
of regularly paying premium wages for overtime work, employers 
are likely to hire more employees. The minimum wage provisions, 





- • 8. 
has to pay his employees more for their basic work week, he 
is likely to increase productivity and lay off some workers. - -
This is especially true when the employer cannot readily 
~ 
raise his prices and pass the increased cost on to his customers. 
The posited effect of stimulating consumer spending is also 
questionable, when the employees' increased salaries must come 
from taxes. Depending on the state's tax structure, the 
increased salaries may simply come out of the pockets of other 
consumers who would be buying the same goods that state 
employees will buy with their raises. 
In deciding whether these objections are sufficient to 
deprive the "economic health theory" of "rational basis" 
status under the commerce clause, it is necessary to keep 
in mind the Court's role. It is not inconsistent with "rational 
basis" review to question the factual grounds presented in 
support of the legis l ation, but the ultimate question is not 
whether the Court believes the regulated practice has an 
effect on interestate corrnnerce, but whether Congress rationally 
could have believed that it did. This suggests that overturning 
the amendments on rational basis grounds would require a rather 
strong refutation of the facts asserted in support of the 
argument that working conditions of state employees, as a 
class, affect commerce. The Court can properly take into 
account the number of state employees who would be affected 
immediately by the 1974 amendments. Out of 11.4 million 
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not already covered by the FLSA were earning less than the 
minimum wage in 1974. The Government estimates that at most 
10% of the newly covered employees were working longer hours 
than the overtime provisions of the Act allow. The first 
category can be viewed as de minimis but if more than a 
million employees are affected by the overtime provisions, 
it would be hard to reach the same conclusion on that part 
of the Act. 
My net impression is that we might be able to write an 
opinion upholding Wirtz but finding too little impact on 
......- ------ __...__ ~ 
commerce to sustain the 1974 amendments as they apply to 
state employees. It would be difficult, however, and it might 
represent a cutback from the Court's recent expansive inter-
pretation of the commerce clause. We would have to conclude 
that all three theories fail the "rational basis" analysis. 
The ruling would not clarify the state-federal issues for the 
future. For these reasons, I would be inclined to rely on the 
principles of federalism to limit the exercise of the commerce ----- ---
power in direct regulation of state activities. 
II. 
The theory I would employ is quite simple. The "rational 
basis" standard for testing congressional power under the 
conunerce clause 
-refit.ct"~ 
the Court's perception 
of its role in implementing the limits on congressional power 
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down legislation that has no relation to the protection of 
cormnerce, it has wisely refused to debate with Congress over 
the wisdom, appropriateness, or efficacy of particular programs, 
as long as they can be rationally justified in relation to 
c ormnercial intercourse among the states. The Court undertakes -lactive review of federal legislation under the commerce clause only when it collides with other provisions of the Constitution. 
This practice suggests that the Court does not perceive the 
limitation implicit in the enumeration of congressional powers 
as a substantial protection for private citizens: citizens 
are not entitled to be free of congressional action unless 
Congress clearly oversteps the limits. Doubts are resolved 
in favor of Congress. 
The Court has a greater role to play inO g the \ \ ; ~r>ll"J: 
) federal system. It quite clearly sits to protect the national 
government from state interference; no other federal body is 
equipped to serve this function. The political restraints on 
Congress make the Court's function as a protector of the states 
less crucial, but the Court still should take a more active - - __,..:was - • - • role in behalf of the states than it takes in behalf of citizens. ~-~-----------'--~ - -....,..,_,, .... -Moreover, the principles of federalism (whether described in 
shorthand terms as the Tenth Amendment or simply called 
-
federalism) operate as an independent constitutional principle L 
~ ,,., ~ .... 
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way that provisions guaranteeing individual liberties do. * 
The difficulty of the case is deciding how best to 
accommodate the two conflicting principles: (1) the national 
interest in centralized authority over matters affecting the 
national economy or the tangible flow of goods between states, 
and (2) the necessity of preserving the states as autonomous 
political units and functioning governments. With the aid 
of Ron, Joel and the Solicitor General, I have identified ---two modes of analysis for reconciling these interests. 
(1) The necessity principle. Congress may include states 
in a general regulatory program when necessary for the program's 
effectiveness. To put it another way, Congress may regulate 
state activities when the national interest requires it. This 
rule would preserve federal power to take effective action in 
the national interest, but it would also establish that the 
u.~~e.cus~~ 
states are entitled to be free of ~••• interference in the 
forms and methods by which they carry out governmental functions. ~~ 
I would have no difficulty, on the facts suggested in 
this case (although perhaps it should be remanded for further 
factual development), concluding that the national interest --
does not require inclusion of all state employees under the ---------------
* I do not suggest that the following analysis should apply to 
other enumerated congressional powers. The war power, for 
example, may justify much more interference with state functions, 
on the ground that during war the national interest is over-
whelming, and the states cannot be allowed to interfere. 
-· n..«:s pri~le, is ~trllY"~ h ~~eJ&.'a( .sta1i~n i~ 4k Co-u.,js 
,t't."iou.~ t.b#W\41\t..t. clw.M- c.asu) b~ it ~Nls. sow.e ~al 
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FLSA. (The reasons generally track my discussion in Part I, 
and I will not repeat it here). The effectiveness of the 
FLSA program as a whole, however, may require inclusion of 
--, Ct:f = = 
those state activities that compete with private enterprise. 
If the states are left out, they would have a competitive 
'-
advantage over private industry that might lead to a mis-
a~ ources. - Th~ s, we might affirm the result in 
 ------
Wirtz as to hospitals, though I have my doubts about schools. 
The "necessity principle" also supports the result we 
reached in Fry, for there is respectable economic authority 
for the proposition that wage and price controls do not work 
unless substantially all wages and prices are frozen. It 
would also support the results in prior cases (other than 
Wirtz) involving a clash between state activities and federal 
commerce power: i n United States v. California, the state 
was operating a railroad in interstate commerce; in Sanitary 
District v. United States, Chicago was diverting water from 
Lake Michigan in quantities the Army Corps of Engineers said 
would lower the water level and impair navigation on all the 
a\so 
Great Lakes. This analysis ~leaves untouched the application 
of Title VII to state employees, because legislation forbidding 
state discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, 
and national origin is easily sustained by reference to 
congressional power under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Because of its nature and history, congressional power to 









by countervailing state interests to the degree I suggest 
here, and perhaps not at all. 
(2) A general balancing analysis. This is the Solicitor 
General's suggestion: to balance the asserted federal interest 
against the degree of interference with state interests. This 
analysis is rather similar to the ,rnecessi ty principle," except 
that it is much looser. It does not start with the premise 
' 
------that the states are entitled to be free of ~ cessary f ~ eral 
interference, but'b::-eats the level of permissible interference 
~
/( ~ 
as a factual matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis. --
It also goes farther in protecting federal power, because it 
would not restrict the federal government to necessary action 
when interference with the states is slight. 
Application of a balancing analysis in this case is less 
certain of result. If the parties' figures are to be believed, 
there is very little difference between the states' employment 
practices without the amendments and the requirements imposed 
by the amendments. This minimal impact, combined with the 
"rational basis" analysis in Part I of this memo, establishes 
that the federal interest is rather small. On the other hand, 
the interference with existing state practices is minimal. 
~
/'-
The only significant problem is the states' objection to 
being regulated by the federal government at all, and this 
interest is diff icult to quantify or compare to the federal 






Either mode of analysis requires disapproval of much 
that was said in Maryland v. Wirtz, in addition to scattered 
declarations in earlier opinions. Either will require some 
substitution of judicial judgment for that of Congress, though 
lI favor the "necessity gEinciple" on the ground that it would esta~lish : rule that is m: re definite and more easily express~d, 
it would inform Congress of what is required for direct regula-
tion of state activities, and it would require analysis of only 
one set of variables. I also think it strikes a fair balance 
between the two interests, and unless it is applied stingily 
it would not rob Congress of the ability to deal flexibly 






lfp/ss 4/17/i Excerpts from Ma. land v. Wirtz, 
392 U.S. 183 
"If a State is engaging in economic activities 
that are validly regulated by the Federal 
Government when engaged in by private persons, 
the State too may be forced to conform its 
activities to federal regulation." (197) 
"This Court has examined and will continue to 
examine federal statutes to determine whether 
there is a rational basis for regarding them 
as regulations of commerce among the States. 
But it will not carve up the commerce power 
to protect enterprises indistinguishable in 
their effect on commerce from private businesses, 
simply because those enterprises happen to be 
run by the States for the benefit of their 
citizens." (198-199) 
J'\(l, ------
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September 27, 1975 
National League of Cities 
If the Court votes to overrrule Wirtz, I might take 
a look at Justice White's Canadian speech, p. 18, for a 
decision by Brandeis o~ stare decisis. 





lfp/ss 3/4/1 • 
March 4, 1976 
No. 74-878/879 National League of Cities ~ 
(My Notes for Use at Conference) 
The Solicitor General's Position 
The SG defends , this legislation by conventional Commerce 
Clause analysis. He establishes easily, relying on the 
"flow" of goods in commerce, an effect upon commerce. 
He then finds a "rational basis" for this regulation by 
relying on the familiar arguments of (i) state labor disputes 
affecting commerce, and (ii) the unfairness of state competition 
with private business. 
The SG adds a third justification, arguing that national 
"economic health" entitles Congress to regulate labor 
conditions of state and local employees. 
The SG concedes, as he must, that his argument as to 
unfair competition has limited applicability. It may apply 
to hospitals (as in Wirtz), only remotely to schools, and 
not at all .N to police, fire , garbage collection and the 
like. 
Constitutional Infirmity in SG's Position 
The SG denies that the power of the federal government 
under the Commerce Clause is different (i.~., more limited) 
when applied to the states themselves, than when applied 




- - 2. 
business" authorities. 
Somewhat inconsistently, however, the SG concedes that 
federal intrusion, directly upon the states and localities, 
under the Commerce Clause, does have a limit. It does not 
justify regulation, the SG says, of "policy making" employees -
although he declines to define this category. 
A more fundamental defect in the SG's position is that 
he apparently assumes the Commerce Clause vests a power that 
is subject to no other constraints. Justice Stewart correctly 
noted that the commerce power, plenary as it may be, cannot 
override other provisions of the Constitution, e.g., First 
Amendment rights. 
In this case, Congress strikes directly at the 
constitutional concept of federalism. There is no express 
provision of the Constitution (other than the Tenth Amendment) 
that articulates a doctrine of federalism. But the entire 
Constitution is structured in conformity with what we call 
federalism, and no one denys that we have a federal system. 
The Cons ti tu tion never woulci have been approved under 
any other theory. To be sure, evolving concepts of the 
respective roles of the federal and state governments have 
diminished the areas in which federalism is determinative. 
Yet the government in this case does not contend that we 
should bury the doctrine; merely, that we should emasculate 




- ~ -f ~ 4,oJC 
Necessity Principle~~:;;:;::~ 
4,..,c-t...,. ~~II ~ GZ_,~~ ,.« ,d.J 
3. 
In my view, this Court is responsible - as one of its 
primary duties - for the preservation of the federal system. 
This requires us to impose (to use equal protection term~nology) 
a stricter degree of scrutiny when federal legislation impinges 
directly on th~ seat66 than when it impinges upon private 
affairs. The familiar "rational basis" analysis is appropriate 
to the sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to 
private individuals and businesses. · But this level of scrutiny 
seems inappropriate when the Congress undertakes to intrude 
directly into the methods of operation of state and local 
governments. 
The principles of federalism should operate here as 
an independent constitutional principle. I think these can 
and must operate to limit exercise of the commerce power to 
protect the states in the same way that provisions guaranteeing 
liberty protect the individual. 
In applying strict scrutiny to this type of legislation, 
I would articulate a "necessity principle". Under this 
concept Congress may include states in a general regulatory 
program only when this is necessary for the program's 
effectiveness. To put it another way, Congress may regulate 
the state's own affairs only when the national interest 
requires it. This rule would preserve federal power to take 
effective action that is clearly necessary in the overall 







if federalism retains any meaningful content, states must be 
free of unnecessary interference in the forms and methods 
by which they carry out governmental functions. 
Fry illustrates the principle. The legislation dealt, 
as our opinion made clear, with a "national emergency", and 
also one of presumed temporary nature. Moreover, the method 
chosen to meet the emergency - ceilings on wages and prices -
would have been frustrated by the omission of any major 
s egment of the country's work force. 
The pr inciple may be applied to the present case. 
We may assume that the national interest requires the FLSA 
program for private enterprise. The program is justified by 
the traditional concerns as to unfair competition and preventing 
.a.ZZ.~,,- t~a__ 
labor disputes. But these concerns apply with a lt@tM!S f orce 
to regulating labor conditions of state and local government 
employees. There is no showing in this case that the basic 
goals of t h e Act can be a ttained only by including such 
employees. 
Thus if strict scrutin7 ~ sis 
~ 
is applied to ascertain 
whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to achieve the 
f ederal goal, the extension of the Act to state and local 
employees cannot be justified. Few of such employees are in 
a-fl,,H-s .,.., ...... ,,,,_ 
c ompetition with private business, and ~ states do ~ allow 
~~A 
c ollective bargainingA«- strikes against the government. 
1'~~r Connnerce Clause cases cannot be reconciled under 





however, that most decisions, rather than expansive dicta, 
can be reconciled. 
No Limit to the Government's Rationale 
5. 
If this legislation is sustained, it is difficult to 
perceive any limit on the power of Congress to intrude directly 
upon the way state and local governments operate. The SG 
could suggest no limit, beyond his unfocused distinction 
between supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. 
As the Governor of Utah suggested, the way would be 
cleared for the following types of action ,¼ch are illustrative 
A 
and not exhaustive: 
Federal mandating of the right of state and local 
employees, including fire and police, to strike. 
Extension of NLRA to all such employees, compelling 
collective bargaining. 
Federally imposed uniformity in fringe benefits, 
including retirement, health and accident benefits. 
Compelling compliance, by state and local agencies 
and operations, with The Occupational Safety and Health 
Act. (~/k.A'o/ a.~,r,,-'l-t ~) 
Imposing upon states and localities the federal Civil 
Service System, with "cradle to grave" type regulation of 
employment, promotion, salaries -and benefits. ·k 
*Fair employment legislation(~·&·, Title VII) may be 
sustained under this analysis by virtue of congressional 
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All of these may be desirable types of regulation. But 
this is not the issue. They relate to the essence of 
federalism: the right of the states to make those decisions 
v?4eb,I~ 
for themselves and the CQEPelatioe right to control their own 
personnel policies. 
One can argue that the states can "trust" Congress not to 
go so far. But the duty of this Court is to apply constitutional 
principle rather than trust to legislative forbearance. The 
extension of FLSA to the states in 1974 is an example. Judging 
by the briefs in this case, virtually every state and city in 
the nation opposes this legislation. The National Governors 
Conference and the National League of Cities are parties. Two 
members of the Cabinet testified against the 1974 Amendment 
and the President vetoed it. Yet, the political muscle of 
organized labor outweighed what appeared to be overwhelming 
local political views to the contrary. 
Distinguish or Overrule Wirtz 
The holding in Wirtz can be distinguished. It is clear 
that Justice Harlan focused primarily on perceived competition 
with private activity: 
"If a state is engaged in economic activities 
that are validly regulated by the federal 
government when engaged in by private persons, 
the state too may be forced to conform its 
activities to federal regulation. This was 
settled by the unanimous decision in United 
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175." Wirtz, 





- - 7. 
But one must acknowledge that the sweep of language in Wirtz 
is broad enough to encompass more than "state enterprises" 
that may be "engaged in by private persons". 
If necessary, I would vote to overrule Wirtz . Mr . Justice 
Brandeis., discussing stare decisis, has said: 
" .•. in cases involving the federal Constitution, 
where correction through legislative action is 
practically impossible, this Court has often 
overruled its earlier decisions." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S., at 405-508 
(dissent) 
~ 
It is clear, at least in areas involving e:reB:s of 
" withdraws benefits once I employment, that the Congress never 
conferred or surrenders power once confirmed. There will be 
no restraint against continued extension of this federal 
power at the expense of states and localities unless checked 
by this Court. It is not too much to say>--tha t a f undamental 
principle of our form of government is at stake in this case . 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
' I 9 
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March 4, 1976 
No. 74-878/879 National League of Cities 
(My Notes for Use at Conference) 
The Solicitor General's Position 
The SG ·defends.. this legislation by conventional Cormnerce 
Clause analysis. He establishes easily, relying on the 
"flow" of goods in couunerce, an effect upon couunerce. 
He then finds a "rational basis" for this regulation by 
reiying on the familiar arguments of (i) state labor disputes 
affecting commerce, and (ii) the unfairness of state competition 
with private business. 
The SG adds a third justificatio~, arguing that national 
"economic health" entitles Congress to regulate labor 
conditions of state and local employees. 
The SG concedes, aas he must, that his argument as to 
unfair competition has limited applicability. It may. apply 
to hospitals (as in Wirtz), only remotely to schools, and 
not at_all as to police, fire, garbage col,lection and the 
like. 
Constitutional Infirmity in SG's Position 
The SG denies that the oower of the federal govemment 
. . 
under th~ Commerce Clause is different <.!-.•!.·, more limited) 
I 
when applied to the states themselves, than· when applied 
C 
to -private businesses. He relies heavily on the "private 
• - 2. 
business" authorities. 
Somewhat inconsistently, however, the SG concedes that 
federal intrusion, directly upon the states and localities, 
under the Commerce Clause, does have a limit. It does not 
;, ,..: ' ·, ~ (· . 
just_ify regulation; the: SG says, of "policy making" employees -
~ ~- ' 
although he declines to define this category. 
..., ~·' ' :'· -~ .. 
A more . fundamental defect in the SG's position is that 
he apparently -assumes the Commerce Clause vests a power that 
(', ~"' 
ta subject to no other constraints. Justice Stewart. correctly 
noted that the commerce power; plenary as it may be, cannot 
override other provisions of the Constitution,~-&•, First 
Amendment rights • 
In this case, Congress strikes directly at the 
constitutional concept of federalism. There is no express 
provision of the Constitution (other than the Tenth Amendment) 
that articulates a doctrine of federalism. But the entire 
Constitution is structured in conformity with what we· call 
federalism, and no one denys that we have a federal system. 
The Constitution never would have been approved under 
any other theory. To be .sure, evolving concepts of the 
respective roles of the federal and state governments have, 
diminished the areas in which federalism is determinative. 
Yet the government in this case does not contend that we 
should bury the doctrine; merely, that we should emasculate 
it at its very core. 
- - 3. 
The Necessity Principle 
In my view, this Court is responsible - as one of it1 
primary duties - for the preservation of the federal system. 
This requires us to impose (to use equal protection terminology) 
a atricter ·degree of •~rutiny when federal legislation impinges 
•. r, . ' 
directly on t~e states than when it impinges upon private 
affairs. 1 The 'familiar "rational basis" analysis is appropriate 
to the _se.~tions , of . ~he Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to 
private individuals and businesses. But this level of scrutiny 
seems inappropriate when the Congress undertakes to intrude 
directly into the methods of operation of state and local 
governments. 
The principles of federalism should operate here as 
an independent con1titutional principle. I think these can 
and must operate to limit exercise of the commerce power to 
protect the states in the same way that provisions guaranteeing 
liberty protect the individual. 
In applying strict scrutiny to this type of legislation, 
I would articulate a "necessity principle". Under this 
concept Congress may include states ;n a general regulatory 
program only when this is necessary for the program's 
effectiveness. To put it another way, Congress may regulate 
the state's own affairs only when the national interest 
requires it. This rule would preserve federal power to take 
effective action that .is clearly necessary in the overall 
national interest. The rule would recognize, however, that 
- - 4. 
if federalism retains any meaningful content, s~ates must be 
free of unnecessary interference in the forms and methods 
by which they carry out governmental functions. 
~ 'illustrates the principle. The legislation dealt, 
as our opinion _made clear, with a "national emergency", and 
also one of presumed temporary nature. Moreover, the method 
chosen to meet the emergency - ceilings on wages .and prices -
would have been frustrated by the omission of any major 
segment of the country's work force. 
The prlinciple may be applied to the present case. 
We may assume that the national interest requires the FLSA 
program for private enterprise. The program is justified by 
the traditional concerns as to unfair competition and preventing 
labor dispute~. , ,But" these concerns apply with al~ernate force 
.- ' 
to regulating labor conditions of state and local government 
; " t 
employee_s. Thei:e is no showing in this case that the basic 
goals . of the.· ~.ct can .- ~e attained only by including such 
employees. 
,-
Thus if strict scrutiny analysis is applied to ascertain 
whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to achieve the 
federal goal, the extension of the Act to state and local 
employees cannot be justified. Few of such employees are in 
' 
competition with private business, and most states- do not allow 
collective bargaining or strikes against the government. 
All pt'io1' Commerce Clause ~~ses cannot be reconciled under 
a strict scrutiny standard focused on, necessity. I believe, 
- -
however, that most decisions, rather than expansive dicta, 
can be reconciled. 
No Limit to the Government's Rationale 
s. 
If this legislation is sustained, it is difficult to 
perceive any limit on -the power of Congress to intrude directly 
upon
1
the way state and local governments operate. The SG 
i I 
could suggest no limit, beyond his unfocused distinction 
between supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. 
I 
As the Govemor of Utah suggested, the way would be 
cleared for the following types of action wich are illustrative 
and not exhaustive: 
Federal mandating of the right of state and local 
employees, including fire and police, to strike. 
Extension of NLRA to all such empioyees, compelling 
collective bargaining. 
Federally imposed uniformity in fringe benefits, 
including retirement, health and accident benefits. 
Compelling compliance, by state and local agencies 
and operations, with The Occupational Safety and Health 
Act. 
Imposing upon states and localities the federal Civil 
Service System, with ''cradle to grave" type regulation of 
employment, promotion, salaries: .. and benefits.* 
¼Fair employment legislation {e.&., Title VII) may be 
sustained under this analysis li'y virtue of congressional 
power under§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
- - 6. 
All of these may be desirable types of regulation. But 
this is not the issue. They relate to the essence of 
federalism: the right of the states to make those decisions 
for , themselves and the correlative right to control their own 
personnel policies. 
One ca~ argue that the states can "trust" Congress not to 
go so far. But the duty of this Court is to apply constitutional 
principle rather than trust to legislative forbearance. The 
extension o; FLSA to t~e states in 1974 is an example. Judging 
,,_ -
t l • • ,:, ..::. 
by the briefs in ' this 'case, virtually every state and city in 
. ., - .. '\ 
- - • ' l 
the 'nation opposes this - legislation. The National Govemors 
" ' . ~- -
Conference and the National League of Cities are· parties. Two 
f, 'r. I 'J. • • 
• - t,. I :' 
members of 'the,:_ eabinet testified against the 1974 Amendment 
and the President vetoed it. Yet, the political muscle of 
organized labor outweighed what appeared to be overwhelming 
local political views to ~he contrary. 
Distinguish or overrule Wirtz 
.The holding in Wirtz can be distinguished. It is clear 
that Justice Harlan focused primarily on perceived competition 
withpprivate activity: 
"If a state is engaged in economic activities 
that are validly regulated by the federal 
government when engaged in by private persons, 
the state too may be forced to con£orm its 
activities to federal regulation. This was 
settled by the unanimous decision in United 
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175." Wirtz, 
392 U.S., at 197. 
- - 7. 
But one must acknowledge that the sweep of language in Wirtz 
is broad enough to encompass more than "state enterprises" 
that may ,be "engaged in by private persons". 
If necessary, I would vote to overrule Wirtz. Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, discussing stare decisis, has said: 
" ••• in cases involving the federal Constitution, 
where correction through ' legislative action is 
practically impossible, this Court has often 
overruled its earlier decisions." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 28S U.S., at 405-S08 
(dissent) 
It i ,s clear, at least in areas involving areas of 
employment, that the Congress never withdraws benefits once 
conferred or surrenders power once confirmed. There will be 
no restraint against continued extension of this federal 
power at the expense of states and localities unless checked 
by this Court. It ia not too much to say, that a fundamental 
principle of our form of government is at stake in this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
Nos. 74-878 AND 74-879 
The National League of Cities 
et al., Appellants, 
74-878 v. 
W. J . Usery, Jr., Secretary of 
Labor. 
State of California, 
Appellant, 
74-879 v. 
W. J . Usery, Jr., Secretary of 
Labor, 
On Appeals from the 
United States District 
Court for the District 
of Columbia. 
[May -, 1976] 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion for the 
Court, 
Nearly 40 years ago Congress enacted the Fair Labor 
Standards Act,1 and required employers covered by the 
Act to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage 2 
and to pay them at one and one-half times their regular 
rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 during a 
work week.3 By this act covered employers were re-
quired to keep certain records to aid in the enforcement 
of the Act,4 and to comply with specified child labor 
standards.5 This Court unanimously upheld the Act as 
1 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. 
·§ 201 et seq. (194-0 ed.) . 
2 29 U. S. C. § 206 (a) (194-0 ed.) . 
8 29 U. S. C. § 207 (a) (3) (1940 ed.). 
4 29 U. S. C. §211 (c) (194-0 ed.). 
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a valid exercise of congressional authority under the com-
merce power in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 
( 1941), observing : 
"Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of 
commerce which do not infringe some constitutional 
prohibition are within the plenary power conferred 
on Congress by the Commerce Clause." Id., at 115. 
The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 
specifically excluded the States and their political sub-
divisions from its coverage.6 In 1974, however, Congress 
enacted the most recent of a series of broadening amend-
ments to the Act. By these amendments Congress has 
extended the minimum wage and maximum hour pro-
visions to almost all public employees employed by the 
States and by their various political subdivisions. Ap-
pellants in these cases include individual cities and States, 
the National League of Cities, and the National Gover-
nors' Conference; 7 they brought an action in the District 
6 29 U, S. C. § 203 (d) (1940 ed.) : 
" 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indjrectly in 
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not 
include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a 
St<tte .... " 
7 Appellants in No. 74--878 are the National League of Cities, the 
National Governors' Conference, the St<ttes of Arizona, Indiana, 
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, the Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., and the 
cities of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Lompoc, Cal., and Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The Appellant in No. 74--879 is the St<tte of California. 
In view of the fact that the appellants include sovereign States 
and their political subdivisions to whom application of the 1974 
amendments is claimed to be unconstitutional, we need not consider 
whether the organizational appellants had standing to challenge the 
Act, See Californi,a Bankers Assn. v. ShuJ,tz, 416 U. S. 21, 44-45 
(1974 ). 
- -
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Court for the District of Columbia which challenged the 
validity of the 1974 amendments. They asserted in 
effect that when Congress sought to apply the Fair Labor 
Standards Act provisions virtually across the board to 
employees of state and municipal governments it "in-
fringed a constitutional prohibition" running in favor of 
the States as States. The gist of their complaint was 
not that the conditions of employment of such public 
employees were beyond the scope of the commerce power 
had those employees been employed in the private sector, 
but that the established constitutional doctrine of inter-
governmental immunity consistently recognized in a long 
series of our cases affirmatively prevented the exercise of 
this authority in the manner which Congress chose in 
the 1974 Amendments. 
I 
In a series of amendments beginning in 1961 Congress 
began to extend the provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to some types of public employees. The 
1961 amendment to the Act 8 extended its coverage to 
persons who were employed in "enterprises" engaged 
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.9 
And in 1966, with the amendment of the definition of 
employers under the Act, 10 the exemption heretofore ex-
tended to the States and their political subdivisions was 
removed with respect to employees of state hospitals, in-
stitutions, and schools. We nevertheless sustained the 
validity of the combined effect of these two amendments 
in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968) . 
In 197 4, Congress again br~adened the coverage of the 
Act. The definition of "employer" in the Act now spe-
cifically "includes a public agency," 29 U. S. C. § 203 (d) . 
8 Pub. L. 87- 30, 75 Stat. 65. 
9 29 U. S. C. §§ 203 (r ), 203 (s) , 206 (b), 207 (a)(2) (1964 ed.). 
1 0 80 Stat. 831, 29 U. S. C, § 203 (d) (1964 ed., Supp. II ). 
- -
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ln addition, the critical definition of "enterprises engaged 
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" 
was expanded to encompass "an activity of a public 
ngency," and goes on to specify that 
"The employees of an enterprise which is a public 
agency shall for purposes of this subsection be 
deemed to be employees engaged in commerce, or in 
the production of goods for commerce, or employees 
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or 
materials that have been moved in or produced for 
commerce." 29 U. S. C. § 203 (s) (5) . 
Under the Amendments "public agency" is in turn de-
fined as including 
"the Government of the United States; the govern-
ment of a State or political subdivision thereof; any 
agency of the United States (including the United 
States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), 
a State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any 
interstate governmental agency." 29 U. S. C. 
203 (x) . 
By its 1974 amendments, then, Congress has now entirely 
removed the exemption previously afforded States and 
their political subdivisions, substituting only the Act's 
general exemption for executive, administrative, or pro-
fessional personnel, 29 U. S. C. § 213 (a) (1) , which is 
supplemented by provisions excluding from the Act's 
coverage those individuals holding public elective office· 
or serving such an officeholder in one of several specific 
capacities. 29 U. S. C. § 203 (e) (2) (C). The Act thus: 
imposes upon almost all public employment the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour requirements previously 
restricted to employees engaged in interstate commerce. 
These requirements are essentially identical to those im-
- -
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posed upon private employers, although the Act does 
attempt to make some provision for public employment 
relationships which are without counterpart in the 
private sector, such as those presented by fire protection 
and law enforcement personnel. See 29 U. S. C. § 207 
(k) . 
Challenging these 1974 amendments in the District 
Court, appellants sought both declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against the amendments' application to them, 
and a three-judge court was accordingly convened pur-
suant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282. That court, after hear-
ing a.rgument on the law from the parties, granted appel-
lee Secretary of Labor's motion to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be 
granted. The District Court stated it was "troubled" by 
appellants' contentions that the amendments would in-
trude upon the States' performance of essential gov-
ernmental functions. The court went on to say that it 
considered their contentions : 
"substantial and that it may well be that the Su-
preme Court will feel it appropriate to draw back 
from the far-reaching implications of [Maryland v. 
Wirtz, supra]; but that is a decision that only the 
upreme Court can make, and as a Federal district 
court we feel obliged to apply the Wirtz opinion as 
it stands." 
We noted probable jurisdiction in order to consider the 
important questions recognized by the District Court. 420 
U. S. 906 (1975).11 We agree with the District Court 
that the appellants' contentions are substantial. Indeed 
upon full consideration of the question we have decided 
that the "far-reaching implications" of Wirtz, should be 
11 When the cases were not decided in October Term, 1974, they 
werl} set down for reargument, 421 U. S. 936 (1975) . 
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overruled, and that the judgment of the District Court 
must be reversed. 
II 
It is established beyond peradventure that the Com-
merce Clause of Art. I of the Constitution is a grant of 
plenary authority to Congress. That authority is, in the 
words of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 
9 Wheat. (21 U, S.) 1 (1824), " ... the power to regu-
late; that is to prescribe the rule by which commerce 
is to be governed." Id., at 196. 
When considering the validity of asserted applications 
of this power to wholly private activity, the Court has 
made it clear that 
" [ e] ven activity that is purely intrastate in char-
acter may be regulated by Congress, where the 
activity, combined with like conduct by others 
similarly situated, affects commerce among the 
States or with foreign nations." Fry v. United 
States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975) . 
Congressional power over areas of private endeavor, even 
when its exercise may pre-empt express state law deter-
minations contrary to the result which has commended 
itself to collective wisdom of Congress, has been held to 
be limited only by the requirement that "the means. 
chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the 
end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 262 (1964). 
Appellants in no way challenge these decisions estab-
lishing the breadth of authority granted Congress under· 
the commerce power. Their contention, on the contrary, . 
is that when Congress seeks to regulate directly the ae-
tivities of States as public employers, it transgresses an 
affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power akin to 
other commerce power affirmative limitations contained 
in. the Constitution. Congressional enactments which_ 
- -
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may be fully within the grant of legislative authority 
contained in the Commerce Clause may nonetheless be 
invalid because found to offend against the right to trial 
by jury contained in the Sixth Amendment, United States 
v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 ( 1968), or the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Leary v. United States, 
395 U. S. 6 (1969). Appellants' essential contention is 
that the 1974 amendments to the Act, while undoubtedly 
within the scope of the Commerce Clause, encounter a 
similar constitutional barrier because they are to be ap-
plied directly to the States and subdivisions of States as 
employers. 
This Court has never doubted that there are limits 
upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, 
even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax 
or to regulate commerce which are conferred by Art. I 
of the Constitution. In Wirtz, for example, the Court 
took care to assure the appellants that it had "ample 
power to prevent ... 'the utter destruction of the 
State as a sovereign political entity,' " which they 
feared. 392 U. S., at 196. Appellee Secretary in this 
case, both in his brief and upon oral argument, has 
agreed that our federal system of government imposes 
definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate 
the activities of the States as States by means of the 
commerce power. See, e. g., Appellee's Brief, at 30-41; 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-43. In Fry, supra, the Court recog-
nized that an express declaration of this limitation is 
found in the Tenth Amendment : 
"While the Tenth Amendment has been character-
ized as a 'truism,' stating merely that 'all is retained 
which has not been surrendered,' United States v. 
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without 
significance. The Amendment expressly declares 
the constitutional policy that Congress may not 
- -
74-878 & 74-879---0PINION 
8, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v: USERY 
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the Statest 
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a 
federal system .. . . " 421 U. S., at 547. 
In New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 526 (1946), 
Chief Justice Stone, speaking for four Members of an 
eight-Member Court in rejecting the proposition that 
Congress could impose taxes on the States so long as it 
did so in a nondiscriminatory manner, observed : 
"A State may, like a private individual, own real 
property and receive income. But in view of out 
former decisions we could hardly say that a general 
nondiscriminatory real estate tax (apportioned), or 
an income tax laid upon citizens and States alike 
could be constitutionally applied to the State's 
capitol, its State-house, its public school houses, 
public parks, or its revenues from taxes or school 
lands, even though all real property and all income 
of the citizen is taxed." 326 U. S., at 587-582. 
The expressions in these more recent cases trace back 
to earlier decisions of this Court recognizing the essential 
role of the States in our federal system of government, 
Chief Justice Chase, perhaps because of the particular 
·time at which he occupied that office, had occasion more 
than once to speak for the Court on this point. In 
Texas v. White , 7 Wall. 700, 725 ( 1869), he declared that 
"[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.n 
In Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 73 (1869), his opinion 
for the Court said : 
"Both the States and the United States existed 
before the Constitution. The people, through that 
instrument, established a more perfect union by sub-
stituting a national government, acting, with ample 
power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the 
- -
74-878 & 74-879-0PINION 
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY '9 
Confederate government which acted with powers, 
greatly restricted, only upon the States. But in 
many Articles of the Constitution the necessary 
existence of the States, and, within their proper 
spheres, the independent authority of the States, is 
distinctly recognized." Id., at 76. 
In Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926), 
the Court likewise observed that "neither government. 
may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial 
manner the exercise of its powers." Id., at 523. 
Appellee Secretary argues that the cases in which this 
Court has upheld sweeping exercises of authority by Con-
gress, even though those exercises pre-empted state regu-
lation of the private sector, have already curtailed the 
sovereignty of the States quite as much as the 1974 
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. We do 
not agree. It is one thing to recognize the authority of 
Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses 
necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the govern-
ment of the Nation and of the State in which they reside~. 
It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of con-. 
gressional authority directed not to private citizens, but 
to the States as States. We have repeatedly recognized 
that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every 
state government which may not be impaired by Congress, 
not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of 
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the 
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority 
in that manner. In Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559 
(1911 ), the Court gave this example of such an attribute : 
"The power to locate its own seat of government 
and to determine when and how it shall be changed 
from one place to another, and to appropriate its 
own public funds for that purpose, are essentially 
- -
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and peculiarly state powers. · That one of the origi-
nal thirteen States could now be shorn of such 
powers by an Act of Congress would not be for a 
moment entertained." 221 U. S., at 565. 
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the 
States' power to determine the wages which shall be paid 
to those whom they employ in order to carry out their 
governmental functions, what hours those persons will 
work, and what compensation will be provided where; 
these employees may be caped upon to work overtime. 
The question we must resolve in this case, then, is. 
whether these determinations are "functions essential to 
separate and independent existence," Coyle v. Smith, su-
pra, at 580, quoting from Lane County v. Oregon, supra, 
at 76, so that Congress may not abrogate the States' 
otherwise plenary authority to make them. 
In their complaint appellants advanced estimates of 
substantial costs which will be imposed upon them by 
the 1974 amendments. Since the District Court dis-
missed their complaint, we take its well-pleaded allega-
tions as true, although it appears from appellee's sub-
missions in the District Court and in this Court that 
resolution of the factual disputes as to the effect of the· 
amendments is not critical to our disposition of the case. 
Judged solely in terms of increased costs in dollars, 
these allegations show a significant impact on the func-
tioning of the governmental bodies involved. The 
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 
County, Tenn., for example, asserted that the Act wilI 
increase its costs of providing essential police and fire 
protection, without any increase in service or in current 
salary levels, by $938,000 per year. Cape Girardeau, 
Mo., estimated that its annual budget for fire protection 
may have to be increased by anywhere from $250,000 to 
$:400,Q0Q aver the cur.rent figure of $350,00Q. The State 
- -
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6f Arizona alleged that the annual additional expendi-
tures which will be required if it is to continue to provide 
essential state services may total $2½ million dollars. 
The State of California, which must devote significant 
portions of its budget to fire suppression endeavors, esti-
mated that application of the Act to its employment 
practices will necessitate an increase in its budget of be-
tween $8 million and $16 million. 
Increased costs are not, of course, the only advers~ 
effects which compliance with the Act will visit upon 
state and local governments, and in turn upon the citi-
zens who depend upon those governments. In its com-
plaint in intervention, for example, California asserted 
that it could not comply with the overtime costs ( ap-
proximately $750,000 per year) which the Act required to 
be paid to California Highway Patrol cadets during their 
academy training program. California reported that it 
had thus been forced to reduce its ac.ademy training pro-• 
gram from 2,080 hours to only 960 hours, a compromise 
undoubtedly of substantial importance to those whose 
safety and welfare may depend upon the preparedness 
of the California Highway Patrol. 
This type of forced relinquishment of important gov-
ernmental activities is further reflected in the complaint's: 
allegation that the City of Inglewood, California, has 
been forced to curtail its affirmative action program for 
providing employment opportunities for men and women 
interested in a career in law enforcement. The Ingle-
wood police department has abolished a program for' 
police trainees who split their week between on the job 
training and the classroom. The city could not abrogate· 
its contractual obligations to these trainees, and it con-, 
eluded that compliance with the Act ih these circum-
stances was too financially burdensome to permit con-
tinuance of the clas!:!room program. The city of Clovis,. 
- -
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Cal., has been put to a similar choice regarding an intern .. 
ship program it was running in cooperation with a Cali-
fornia State University. According to the complaint, 
because the interns' compensation brings them within 
the purview of the Act the city must decide whether to 
eliminate the program entirely or to substantially reduce 
its beneficial aspects by doing away with any pay for the 
interns. 
Quite apart from the substantial costs imposed upon 
the States and their political subdivisions, the Act dis-
places state policies regarding the manner in which they 
will structure delivery of those governmental services 
which their citizens require. The Act, speaking directly 
to the States qua States, requires that they shall pay 
all but an extremely limited minority of their employees 
the minimum wage rates currently chosen by Congress. 
It may well be that as a matter of economic policy it 
would be desirable that States, just as private employers, 
comply with these minimum wage requirements. But it 
cannot be gainsaid that the federal requirement directly 
supplants the considered policy choices of the States' 
elected officials and administrators as to how they wish to 
structure pay scales in state employment. The State 
might wish to employ persons with little or no training, 
or those who wish to work on a casual basis, or those who 
for some other reason do not possess minimum employ-
ment requirements, and pay them less than the federally 
prescribed minimum wage. It may wish to offer part 
time or summer employment to teenagers at a figure less 
than the minimum wage, and if unable to do so may 
decline to offer such employment at all. But the Act 
would forbid such choices by the States. The only "dis-
cretion" left to them under the Act is either to attempt to 
increase their revenue to meet the additional financial 
burden imposed upon them by paying congressionally 
prescribed wages to their existing complement of em-
- -
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ployees, or to reduce that complement to a number which 
c~n be paid the federal minimum wage without increas-
ing revenue.12 
This dilemma presented by the minimum wage restric-
tions may seem not immediately different from that 
faced by private employers, who have long been cov-
ered by the Act and who must find ways to increase 
their gross income if they are to pay higher wages while 
maintaining current earnings. The difference, however, 
is that a State is not merely a factor in the "shifting 
economic arrangements" of the private sector of the 
economy, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 95 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J ., concurring) , but is itself a coordinate 
element in the system established by the framers for 
governing our federal union. 
The degree to which the FLSA amendments would 
interfere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty can 
be seen even more clearly upon examining the overtime 
requirements of the Act. The general effect of these 
provisions is to require the States to pay their employees 
at premium rates whenever their work exceeds a specified 
number of hours in a given period. The asserted reason 
for these provisions is to provide a financial disincentive 
upon using employees beyond the work period deemed 
appropriate by Congress. According to appellee, 
" [t] his premium rate can be avoided if the [State] 
uses other employees to do the overtime work. This, 
in effect, tends to discourage overtime work and to 
spread employment, which is the result Congress 
intended." Appellee's Brief, at 43. 
12 The complaint recited that a number of appellants were pro-
hibited by their state constitutions from incurring debts in excess 
·of taxes for the current year. Those constitutions also impose 
·ceilings upon the percentage rates at which property might be 
taxed by those governmental units. App. 36-37. 
- -
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We do not doubt that this may be a salutary result, and 
that it has a sufficiently rational relationship to com-
merce to validate the . application of the overtime pro-
visions to private employers. But, like the minimum 
wage provisions, the vice o~ the Act as sought to be ap-
plied here is that it directly penalizes the States for 
choosing to hire governmental employees on terms differ-
ent from those which Congress has sought to impose. 
This congressionaily imposed displacement of state 
decisions may substantially restructure traditional ways 
in which the local governments have arranged their af-
fairs. Although at this point many of the actual effects 
under the proposed Amendments remain a matter of 
·some dispute among the parties, enough can be satis-
factorily anticipated for an outline discussion of their 
general import. The requirement imposing premium 
rates upon any employment in excess of what Con-
gress has decided is appropriate for a governmental 
employee's workweek, for example, appears likely to have 
the effect of coercing the States to structure work periods 
in some employment areas, such as police and fire pro-
tection, in a manner substantially different from prac-
tices which have long been commonly accepted among 
local governments of this Nation. In addition, appellee 
represents that the Act will require that the pl'.emium 
compensation for overtime worked must be paid in cash, 
rather than with compensatory time off, unless such com-
pensatory time is taken in the same pay period. Ap-
pellee's Supp. Brief, at 9-10; see Dunlop v. New Jersey, 
522 F . 2d 504 (CA3 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-532. 
· This too appears likely to be highly disruptive of ac-
cepted employment practices in many governmental 
areas where the demand for a number of employees to 
perform important jobs for extended periods on short 
notice can be both unpredictable and critical. Another 
· example of congressional choices displacing those of the 
• - -
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States in the area of wha.t are without doubt essential 
governmental decisions may be found in the practice of 
using volunteer firemen, a source of manpower crucial 
to many of our smaller towns' existence. Under the reg-
ulations proposed by appellee, whether individuals are 
indeed "volunteers" rather than "employees" subject to · 
the minimum wage provisions of the Act are questions to 
be decided in the courts. See Appellee's Brief, at 49 and 
n. 41. It goes without saying that provisions such as 
these contemplate a significant reduction of traditional 
volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn 
on to complement the operation of many local govern-
mental functions. 
Our examination of the effect of the 1974 amendments, 
as sought to be extended to the States and their political 
subdivisions, satisfies us that both the minimum wage 
and the maximum hour provisions will impermissibly 
interfere with the integral governmental functions of 
these bodies. We earlier noted some disagreement be-
tween the parties regarding the precise effect the amend-
ments will have in application. We do not believe par-
ticularized assessments of actual impact are crucial to 
resolution of the isue presented, however. For even if 
we accept appellee's assessments concerning the impact 
of the amendments, their application will nonetheless 
significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to struc-
ture employer-employee relationships in such areas as 
fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public 
health, and parks and recreation. These activities are 
typical of those performed by state and local govern-
men ts in discharging their dual functions of administer-
ing the public law and furnishing public services.13 
13 These examples are obviously not an exhaustive catalogue of 
the numerous line and support activities which are well within the 
area of traditional operations of state and local governments. 
- -
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Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments 
are created to provide, services such as these which the 
States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If Con-
gress may withdraw from the States the authority to 
make those fundamental employment decisions upon 
which their systems for performance of these functions 
must rest, we think there would be little left of the 
States' "separate and independent existence." Coyle, 
supra. Thus, even if appellants may have overestimated 
the effect which the Act will have upon their current 
levels and patterns of governmental activity, the disposi-
tive factor is that Congress has attempted to exercise its 
Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages 
and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their 
capacities as sovereign governments. In so doing, Con-
gress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that 
would impair the States' "ability to function effectively 
within a federal system," Fry, supra, at 547. This ex-
ercise of congressional authority does not comport with 
the federal system of government embodied in the Con-
stitution. We hold that insofar as the challenged 
amendments operate to directly displace the States' 
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tra-
ditional governmental functions, they are not within the / 
authority granted Congress by Art. I , § 8, cl. 3.14 
III 
One final matter requires our attention. Appellee has 
vigorously urged that we cannot, consistently with the 
Court's decisions in Wirtz, supra, and Fry, supra, rule 
14 We express no view as to whether different results might ob- I 
tain if Congress seeks to . e · gov-
ernmental operations by ~rcising authority granted it under other 
sections of the Constitutio such as the Spending Power, Art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteent Amendment. 
~~ § <J'zt..f6 ~ ~ 
• - -
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against him here. It is important to examine this con-
tention so that it will be clear what we hold today, and 
what we do not. 
With regard to Fry, we disagree with appellee. There 
the Court held that the Economic Stabilization Act of 
1970 was constitutional as applied to temporarily freeze 
the wages of state and local government employees. The 
Court expressly noted that the degree of intrusion upon 
the protected area of state sovereignty was in that case 
even less than that worked by the amendments to the 
FLSA which were before the Court in Wirtz. The Court 
recognized that the Economic Stabilization Act was "an 
emergency measure to counter severe inflation that 
threatened the national economy." 421 U. S., at 548. 
We think our holding today quite consistent with Fry. 
The enactment at issue there was occasioned by an ex-
tremely serious problem which endangered the well-being 
of all the component parts of our federal system and 
which only collective action by the National Government 
might forestall. The means selected were carefully 
drafted so as not to interfere with the States' freedom 
beyond a very limited, specific period of time. The 
effect of the across-the-board freeze authorized by that 
Act, moreover, displaced no state choices as to how gov-
ernmental operations should be structured nor did it 
force the States to remake such choices themselves. In-
stead, it merely required that the wage scales and em-
ployment relationships which the States themselves had 
chosen be maintained during the period of the emer-
gency. Finally, the Economic Stabilization Act oper-
ated to reduce the pressures upon state budgets rather 
than increase them. These factors distinguish the 
statute in Fry from the provisions at issue here_ 
The limits imposed upon the commerce power when 
Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflex-
- -
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ible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to 
combat a national emergency. "[A]lthough an emer-
gency may not call into life a power which has never 
lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for 
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." Wilson 
v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917) . 
With respect to the Court's decision in Wirtz, we reach 
a different conclusion. _ Both appellee and the District 
Court thought that decision required rejection of appel-
lants' claims. Appellants, in turn, advance several argu-
ments by which they seek to distinguish the facts before 
the Court in Wirtz from those presented by the 1974 
amendments to the Act. There are undoubtedly factual 
distinctions between the two situations, but in view of 
the conclusions expressed earlier in this opinion we do 
not believe the reasoning in Wirtz may any longer be 
regarded as authoritative. 
Wirtz relied heavily on the Court's decision in United 
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 ( 1936). The opinion 
quotes the following language from that case : 
" '[We] look to the activities to which the states 
have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary 
of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. 
But there is no such limitation upon the plenary 
power to regulate commerce. The State can no. 
more deny the power if its exercise has been author-
ized by Congress than can an individual. ' 297 U. S., 
at 185:" 392 U. S., at 198. 
But we have reaffirmed today that the States as States 
stand on a quite different footing than an individual or 
a corporation when cha.llenging the exercise of Congress' 
power to regulate commerce. We think the dicta 1 5 from 
1 5 The holding of United States v. CaJ,if ornia, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), 
as opposed to the language quoted in the text , is quite consistent 
'Yith, our holding today. There California's activity to which the-
- -
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United States v. California, simply wrong. Congress 
may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon 
the States its choices as to how essential decisions regard-
ing the conduct of integral governmental functions are 
to be made. We agree that such assertions of power, if 
unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cau-
tioned in his dissent in Wirtz, allow "the National Gov-
ernment [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty.'" 
392 U. S., at 205, and would therefore transgress the 
bounds of the authority granted Congress under the Com-
merce Clause. While there are obvious differences 
between the schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and 
the fire and police departments affected here, each pro-
vides an integral portion of those governmental services 
which the States and their political subdivisions have 
traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore 
persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled. 
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly 
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ing_s consistent with this: opinion. 
So ordered .. 
congressional command was directed was not in an area that the 
States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activi-
ties. It was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged 
in "common carriage by rail in interstate commerce .... " 297 
U. S., at 182. 
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